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   Product Diversi￿cation and Labor Productivity




Empirical research has shown tremendous productivity di￿erences, even within
narrowly de￿ned industries. A great host of studies is explainsing this pro-
ductivity disparity by factors such as idiosyncratic technology shocks, input
price di￿erences, management skills, or international trade. Although these
explanations are undoubtedly important, the current paper suggests that prod-
uct diversi￿cation strategies of ￿rms can also play an important role. Using a
matched producer-product panel dataset of German manufacturing industries
over the period 2003-2006, we ￿nd that the average degree of product diversi-
￿cation across industry establishments is positively related to within-industry
labor productivity dispersion.
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Micro-level data on the distribution of productivity and the evolution of productivity
growth show persistent productivity di￿erentials across ￿rms, even within narrowly
de￿ned industries (see Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; for an overview). Salter (1960),
analyzing the dispersion of labor productivity among plants producing pig-iron, for
instance, ￿nds that the best-practice pig-iron facility produced twice as many tons
per labor-hour as the industry average. Criscuolo et al. (2003), performing similar
calculations for UK manufacturing, show that the productivity at the 90 thpercentile
of the productivity distribution is over ￿ve times larger than the productivity at the
10th percentile. The persistence of productivity di￿erentials is puzzling and gives rise
to a number of questions since classical economic theory rather suggests that poorly
performing ￿rms operating in workable markets should not be capable of survival.
As a consequence, productivity dispersion is expected to decrease over time.
Theoretical models of industry dynamics that explain ￿rm heterogeneity and generate
complex patterns of ￿rm productivity distribution over time can be found in the liter-
ature. The Jovanovic (1982) model of industry evolution assumes pro￿t maximizing
￿rms endowed with time-invariant e￿ciency levels. Through a process of selection,
less productive ￿rms recognize that they are never going to be pro￿table and exit the
market. Since e￿cient ￿rms survive while ine￿cient ones fail, the average e￿ciency
of the survivors improves from period to period. Ericson and Pakes (1995) develop
a model that accounts for many of the phenomena observable in ￿rm-level datasets.
The model assumes ￿rms investing in R&D in order to enhance their capability to
earn pro￿ts. Due to idiosyncratic shocks, the outcome of the investment is uncertain.
As a consequence, very productive ￿rms can even obtain e￿ciency losses. In contrast
to ine￿cient ￿rms, however, very productive businesses can immediately respond to
negative external shocks making them both larger in size and output in the long-run.
Even though theoretical models generating persistent productivity dispersion have
some appeal, empirical investigation may provide a more compelling way to describe
what is observed in the data. There has de￿nitely been progress in explaining the
reasons why productivity levels are so di￿erent across businesses, but still, some
in￿uences have not yet been discussed. In particular, the role played by product di-
versi￿cation strategies of ￿rms has completely been neglected by empirical economists
so far. In this respect, our study makes important contributions to the existing lit-
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relationship between product diversi￿cation and productivity disparity using a micro-
level dataset on German manufacturing industries. Second, by exploiting the panel
structure of the data, to some extent, we overcome the limitations of related studies
that solely rely on cross-sectional analysis (e.g., Syverson, 2004b). The results of
this paper can shortly be summarized. We ￿nd that the aggregate degree of product
diversi￿cation can be regarded as one of the central factors explaining productivity
heterogeneity of ￿rms within narrowly de￿ned industries.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review
the literature that discusses various sources of within-industry productivity disper-
sion. Section 3 speci￿es the data used and we refer to the underlying methodology.
The results of the empirical analysis are reported in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Determinants of Productivity Dispersion
Technology related factors. Among the various explanations for the existence of
productivity di￿erentials, the impact of innovation is by far the most discussed in
the literature. Nelson (1981) emphasizes that di￿erences among ￿rms in access to
and knowledge about new technologies cause cross-sectional productivity dispersion.
In his view, ￿rms often make wrong bets about new technologies. Since imitation
is costly and time consuming technological advance yields disproportionately high
returns to successful innovators. In a related study, Nelson (1991) stresses the im-
portance of reorganization in order to transform new technology into productivity
gains. Accordingly, organizational di￿erences, in particular di￿erences in the ability
to generate and gain innovation, can be considered to be sources for durable pro-
ductivity dispersion across ￿rms. Similar arguments can be found in a model by
Caselli (1999), where productivity heterogeneity is generated through di￿erentials in
the rate of technology adaptation. The relationship between R&D investment pat-
terns, technological shocks and productivity at the micro level has been proven in
a number of empirical studies (see Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1991; Hall and Mairesse,
1995; Dunne, 1994; among others).
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management skills and human capital may be important factors behind productivity
heterogeneity (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) collect
data about managerial practices for a sample of 732 medium-sized manufacturing
￿rms in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Their results
show that management quality accounts for around 33 per cent of inter-quartile
di￿erences in productivity. Womack et al. (1990) and Oliver et al. (1996) compare
the quality and productivity of ￿rms in the automotive industry. They argue that
performance variations can be traced back to management practices and the adoption
of lean-thinking principles. Abowd et al. (1999), Haltiwanger et al. (1999), and Haskel
et al. (2005) investigate the relation between productivity and worker skills. All of
them ￿nd that highly productive ￿rms are more likely to have better skilled workers.
Market size, international trade and competition . The international involvement of
a sector and market size e￿ects have recently been studied as drivers behind within-
industry dynamics. Building on the dynamic industry model to monopolistic com-
petition by Hopenhayn (1992), Melitz (2003) theoretically examines the in￿uence of
international trade on the reallocation of market shares. The model shows how trade
exposure induces more productive ￿rms to export, while forcing the least productive
ones to exit. Both the exit of less productive and the additional exports gained by
productive ￿rms reallocate market shares towards the e￿cient ￿rms and contribute
to an aggregate productivity increase. The model of Melitz (2003) implies lower
within-industry productivity dispersion for sectors with intensi￿ed international in-
volvement. A number of empirical studies disclose superior characteristics of ex-
porting ￿rms relative to those merely producing for domestic markets (Bernard and
Jensen, 1997; Richardson and Rindal, 1995; Bernard and Wagner, 2001). Note that
the causality between productivity and exporting could run both ways: One the one
hand, high productivity ￿rms might be more likely to overcome barriers to exporting
than less productive ￿rms. On the other hand, due to their exposure to foreign com-
petitors, exporters may bene￿t from learning about new production technologies, and
therefore attain higher productivity levels. 1 Based on the dynamic industry model of
Melitz (2003), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) analyze the e￿ect of market size on the
toughness of competition. Similar to Asplund and Nocke (2006), the model predicts
intensi￿ed competition and, consequently, less dispersion of within-industry produc-
tivity for larger markets. This result is due to the fact that an increase in market
size induces prices to fall. For some ine￿cient ￿rms the pro￿t margins then become
1 Bernard and Jensen (1999) stress that productivity causes exporting and not vice versa.
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been recognized by Oulton (1998). He argues that di￿erences between sectors in the
extent of productivity dispersion can be attributed to varying degrees of competition.
Since imperfect competition permits ine￿ciencies to persist, less competitive sectors
have signi￿cant higher productivity dispersions.
Regulation and market intervention policies. Olley and Pakes (1996) emphasize the
fact that regulatory policy a￿ects productivity heterogeneity. Their case study of
the U.S. telecommunication equipment industry shows that deregulation in￿uences
the choices of innovative activities, and the input and output volumes of producers
and potential entrants. Reduced entry barriers due to deregulation policy encourage
new ￿rms to step into the market, and force ine￿cient ￿rms to exit. As a result,
an increase in aggregate productivity and a decrease of productivity dispersion after
deregulation is observable. Similar ￿ndings are obtained by Arnold et al. (2008).
Using cross-country ￿rm-level data the authors show that regulation ampli￿es the
productivity dispersion by hampering the allocation of resources towards the most
dynamic and e￿cient ￿rms. Arnold et al. (2008) also point out that deregulation
does not immediately lead to lower dispersion. Since predominantly e￿cient ￿rms at
the top of the productivity distribution bene￿t from deregulation, during a transition
phase, productivity can even become more dispersed. This is due to the fact that
it takes some time to drive low performers out of the market. Other market inter-
vention policies such as R&D subsidies can have similar e￿ects. On the one hand,
if subsidies encourage potential entrants to enter, more intensi￿ed competition will
tend to decrease the productivity dispersion. One the other hand, if predominantly
incumbent ￿rms receive subsidies some relatively ine￿cient producer are enabled
to remain in the market, while potential entrants will be deterred from entry as a
consequence of the increased number of competitors.
Product diversi￿cation and demand-side factors. Most of the studies previously ex-
amined highlight the impact of supply-side factors on the productivity dispersion
of industries, while studies investigating the demand-side as a source for persistent
productivity heterogeneity are rather underrepresented. A remarkable exception is
a study by Syverson (2004a) proposing that demand-side features also play a role in
creating productivity variation within narrowly de￿ned industries. The paper for-
malizes a theoretical model that incorporates consumers choosing among di￿erenti-
ated products sold by suppliers being heterogeneous with respect to their production
costs. The model predicts that markets with higher spatial demand density (i.e.,
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less productivity dispersion than low demand density markets. In fact, using data
from the U.S. ready-mixed concrete industry, Syverson (2004a) shows that geographic
substitution barriers can partly explain a persistent within-industry productivity dis-
persion. In addition, Syverson (2004b) theoretically and empirically investigates how
output market segmentation (respectively product diversi￿cation) a￿ects the produc-
tivity disparity within industries. The link between output market segmentation and
an industry’s productivity dispersion is assumed to be as follows. Suppose perfect
homogeneity of outputs in an industry, then the ￿rm that produces at lowest costs
(i.e., with highest productivity) attracts the entire demand. However, perfect homo-
geneity of industry outputs (products) typically does not exist in reality. Physical
product diversi￿cation in response to diverse consumer preferences leads to output
market segmentation. This output market segmentation decreases the competition-
driven selection process and allows less productive ￿rms to survive, which results in
a persistent within-industry productivity dispersion.
Sunk entry costs and ￿xed operating costs. Although Syverson (2004b) mainly fo-
cuses on the in￿uence of output market segmentation on productivity disparity, his
theoretical model and empirical analysis also incorporates other in￿uential factors
relating to the productivity distribution. In the spirit of Hopenhayn (1992), he dis-
cusses the idea that both sunk entry costs and ￿xed operating costs impinge on
the critical productivity cuto￿ level, 2 and therefore on the moments of the indus-
try productivity distribution. Sunk costs act as entry barriers that allow incumbent
￿rms to charge higher average price levels. Higher average price levels in turn per-
mit relatively ine￿cient ￿rms to cover their ￿xed costs, and hence to remain in the
market. Consequently, a positive e￿ect of sunk costs on the productivity dispersion
is predicted. The e￿ect of ￿xed costs goes in the opposite direction. Higher ￿xed
production costs lower the equilibrium productivity cuto￿ level and make it more
di￿cult for ine￿cient producers to be pro￿table. Thus, all else equal, industries
with high ￿xed costs shares are assumed to exhibit less dispersion and higher central
tendency moments of the productivity distribution.
The current paper is similar in spirit to that of Syverson (2004b), which examines
the e￿ect of product diversi￿cation on productivity dispersion. In addition, we of-
fer an empirical analysis that exploits the panel structure of our data. Further,
industry-level product diversi￿cation is measured in a slightly di￿erent way. Syver-
2 Only ￿rms operating above this critical productivity cuto￿ level achieve nonnegative pro￿ts.
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four-digit SIC industry) is based on the production share of each product line (de-
￿ned at a seven-digit SIC product classi￿cation system) within an industry. Using
merely production shares of production lines has the disadvantage that it is impossi-
ble to disentangle whether an industry’s output is divided among a large number of
establishments or whether the total industry output is exclusively produced by one
￿rm. Further, Syverson’s approach neglects the fact that ￿rms do not only pursue
diversi￿cation strategies within the boundary of the industry they are assigned to
according to the industry classi￿cation scheme, but also diversify into related or un-
related product markets. As a consequence, we follow Gollop and Monahan (1991)
and derive an aggregate industry diversi￿cation index that will be based in the ￿rst
step on the degree of diversi￿cation measured at the level of ￿rms. Section 3 discusses
the manner in which may be developed such a diversi￿cation index. But before this,
it is necessary to refer to the motivation of ￿rms to engage in product diversi￿cation.
Further, we have to identify a link between the aggregate degree of diversi￿cation
and within-industry productivity dispersion.
2.2 Diversi￿cation Motives and the Link to Productivity Dis-
persion
The motivation of ￿rms to diversify has been studied extensively by both economists
and business researchers. Though the literature o￿ers a great variety of perspectives
that synthesize a number of individual points, it seems to be reasonable to categorize
three main ways of thinking. We distinguish between the resource-, the agency-, and
the market power view.3
The resource view states that ￿rms enter new markets in response to unused produc-
tive resources (Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1980). The existence of unused resources such
as knowledge and technology is due to learning processes that occur in the course
of operating a business. Resources, however, are deeply embedded in the routines
of a ￿rm (Nelson and Winter, 1982), and cannot be e￿ectively sold in the market.
Consequently, a ￿rm has an incentive to expand to new markets since only this pro-
vides a reasonable way to absorb its underused resources and to generate economies
of scope (Teece, 1982).
3 See Montgomery (1994), Ramanujam and Varadarajan (1989), and Jovanovic and Gilbert (1993)
for an overview of the various motives to diversi￿cation.
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diversi￿ed ￿rms. The most prominent argument in this regard is the possibility for
cross subsidization, in which a ￿rm uses its pro￿ts from one market to support preda-
tory power in another. The opportunity to engage in predatory pricing disciplines
rivals planning to cut prices, and deters potential entrants by establishing market
entry barriers.
The agency view stresses the fact that managers follow strategies that are not in
line with the pro￿t maximization interest of shareholders (Marris, 1964; Mueller,
1969). Besides the motivational commitment of empire-building it is argued that
managers pursue diversi￿cation in order to reduce total ￿rm risk, and thus their
personal employment risk (Montgomery, 1994). As pointed out by Markham (1973),
bene￿ts from product diversi￿cation originate from combining businesses with earn-
ings streams that are not highly correlated. Weston and Mansingka (1971) de￿ned
this kind of diversi￿cation as ’defensive diversi￿cation’ which protects a ￿rm’s earn-
ing stream from adverse environmental changes taking place in its home market.
Hence, product diversi￿cation can be regarded as a special form of a portfolio selec-
tion strategy that induces capital lenders to attach smaller risk premiums due to a
reduced likelihood of bankruptcy (Markowitz, 1952).
We now come to the question why we expect a positive correlation between product
diversi￿cation and productivity dispersion at the industry-level. In this respect,
the agency- and the market power view play a vital role. One possible source for
an interdependence is associated with the ’defense diversi￿cation’ motive of ￿rms.
When a ￿rm spreads its activities across di￿erent markets, it does not solely have
to rely on pro￿ts generated by its main activity. This decreases the vulnerability
to external shocks, and thus the danger of market exit. Consider for illustrative
purposes the case of a ￿rm that is not diversi￿ed at all, i.e., produces in just one
industry. According to Syverson (2004b), this ￿rm would be able to survive in the
long-run if, and only if, its productivity level is well above the industry cuto￿ level.
Now suppose an external shock triggered by an innovation occurs that shifts the
industry productivity cuto￿ level beyond the ￿rm’s current productivity level. In
this case, the undiversi￿ed ￿rm becomes extremely vulnerable to market exit, since
the coverage of ￿xed costs is no longer given. In contrast, a diversi￿ed ￿rm exhibiting
the same productivity level as the undiversi￿ed ￿rm can still rely on positive pro￿ts
generated in other business lines to cover ￿xed costs. This gives the diversi￿ed
￿rm more time to adapt to the external shock, and does not immediately lead to
8
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forces than undiversi￿ed ￿rms. Now suppose an industry is characterized by a large
share of ￿rms that carry out product diversi￿cation strategies causing a high average
degree of diversi￿cation across industry establishments. If our conjecture holds, the
selection process in this kind of industry is much weaker compared to industries
featuring lower degrees of average product diversi￿cation. Since decreases in the
toughness of competition due to diversi￿cation allow relatively ine￿cient producers
to keep on operating, we expect a positive relationship between the average degree
of product diversi￿cation and within-industry productivity dispersion.
Another potential source for an interdependence is associated with the market power-
view, and can be found in the literature on inter￿rm competition. Most remarkable
in this context is the formal analysis o￿ered by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) that
links patterns of inter￿rm rivalry to competitive conditions in the industry. The
model by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) is based on what is known in the litera-
ture as ’mutual forbearance’ (Edwards, 1995). Mutual forbearance means that ￿rms
frequently encounter each other in multiple product markets recognize their interde-
pendence and compete less vigorously, because they weight the prospect of advantage
in one market against the danger of retaliatory attacks in other markets. The out-
come of multimarket interaction is therefore a reduction in competition (Baum and
Korn, 1996). Since product diversi￿cation by its nature increases the probability
of diversi￿ed companies to meet each other in multiple markets, we consider the
aggregate degree of product diversi￿cation in an industry to be an indicator of the
potential of mutual forbearance. As mutual forbearance implies an undermining of
competition forces, ine￿cient producers are more likely to stay in the market. This
tends to increase productivity disparity, and thus a positive relationship between
aggregate product diversi￿cation and productivity dispersion at the industry-level is
expected.
2.3 Di￿erent Patterns of Diversi￿cation across Industries
After a discussion of potential motives of ￿rms to engage in diversi￿cation and a
detection of a link between diversi￿cation and productivity dispersion, it is notewor-
thy to emphasize that a ￿rm’s decision to diversify heavily depends on the industry
in which it is actually operating. Not all industries in the same manner o￿er the
potential to diversify. Numerous empirical studies show remarkable inter-industry
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et al., 1984; among others). The reasons for inter-industry di￿erences are mani-
fold, but technology-related explanations are mostly prevalent. We have already
pointed out that resources have long been recognized to be among the key factors
in explaining product diversi￿cation. If a ￿rm possess excess resources being ￿exi-
ble enough to be applied outside the ￿rm’s primary activity, it has an incentive to
expand. However, as Gorecki (1975) emphasizes, before a speci￿c resource can be
transferred outside the core market, it has to be modi￿ed or adapted. This process
involves costs which heavily impinge on a ￿rm’s decision to diversify. Chatterjee
and Wernerfelt (1991) point out that those transfer costs are smaller the more ho-
mogeneous industries are with respect to their technological nature. In this view,
it is not surprising that Lemelin (1982) and Carleton et al. (1984) ￿nd that ￿rms
tend to diversify into industries which use resources similar to their own. More re-
cently, Breschi et al. (2003) tested the extent to which ￿rms diversify their innovative
activities across related technological ￿elds. Their results show that ￿rms follow a
coherent pattern of technological diversi￿cation. In fact, ￿rms diversify into techno-
logical ￿elds and industries that share a common or complementary knowledge base,
rely upon common scienti￿c principles or have similar heuristics of search. However,
there are remarkable di￿erences across industries with respect to the potential to
transfer knowledge and production technologies into related ￿elds. Consider, for in-
stance, the textile industry. The textile industry provides the opportunity for broad
product diversi￿cation strategies because of the large spectrum of sub-segments that
all require similar technological competences. Moreover, parts of the technology used
to produce textiles can also be applied in related sectors such as footwear production.
Petroleum processing can be regarded as another extreme case. Here, ￿rms are much
more restricted by the range of possible applications of their technology. The few
number of sub-segments makes it hard for ￿rms to accomplish related diversi￿cation
strategies. Further, since the production technology used is highly specialized, also
an unrelated diversi￿cation is virtually impossible.
10
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Our analysis is based on micro data from the German Cost Structure Census of
Manufacturing,4 the Monthly Report of Local Units in Manufacturing, 5 and the
Production Census of Manufacturing 6 over the time period 2003 to 2006. The Cost
Structure Census of the German Federal Statistical O￿ce is an annually conducted
representative random sample survey of around 18,000 companies in the manufac-
turing sector with at least 20 employees. It is a full census of all ￿rms with over
499 employees.7 For all other reporting units, it consists of a representative rotating
sample with panel properties. The random sample quota for ￿rms with 20 to 249
employees is 38 percent, and 73 percent for ￿rms with 250 to 499 employees. The
cost structure survey o￿ers various information including industry a￿liation, type of
business, ￿nal output, number of employees, number and amount of R&D expendi-
ture as well as the number of R&D employees payroll, received subsidies, employer
contributions to the social security system, fringe bene￿ts, expenditures for material
inputs, energy expenditures and taxes. The Monthly Report of Establishments in
Manufacturing is a questionnaire that is used to derive data about domestic and
non-domestic turnover as well the number of hours worked. Since the monthly re-
port is conducted at the establishment level, we aggregate the information over all
months, and all establishments belonging to the same ￿rm. The Production Census
of Manufacturing is a monthly/quarterly 8 report of manufacturing establishments
on the type, amount, and value of products produced. The respective product data
is collected at a four-digit product classi￿cation level. For the purpose of this pa-
per, we assign the establishment-level data to the relevant ￿rms and aggregate to
annual ￿gures. We then proceed by building a producer-product-panel that merges
the information from the Cost Structure Survey, the Monthly Report of Establish-
ments in Manufacturing, and the Production Census of Manufacturing. The resulting
unbalanced panel contains relevant information of 16.442 ￿rms in 189 four-digit man-
ufacturing industries.9 Since the aim of the paper is to investigate the relationship
between product diversi￿cation and productivity dispersion, we use the data from
4 Kostenstrukturerhebung im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe sowie des Bergbaus und der Gewinnung
von Steinen und Erden.
5 Monatsbericht f￿r Betriebe des Verarbeitenden Gewerbes sowie des Bergbaus und der Gewin-
nung von Steinen und Erden.
6 Produktionserhebung im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe sowie des Bergbaus und der Gewinnung von
Steinen und Erden.
7 See Fritsch et al. (2004) for further details.
8 Firms or establishments with fewer than 20 employees are required to report quarterly.
9 All ￿rm belonging to the sub-sectors mining and quarrying are excluded.
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number of control variables at a four-digit industry level.
In our econometric analysis, we are interested in a relationship between product di-
versi￿cation and intra-industry productivity heterogeneity. If our conjecture holds,
higher amounts of aggregate product diversi￿cation should be associated with higher
levels of productivity dispersion. The presumed link is due to the fact that diversi-
￿cation strategies allow relatively unproductive ￿rms to escape intense competition
forces and to survive in the longer run. This in turn causes persistent productivity
di￿erentials and lower central tendency moments in the productivity distribution for
industries with high degrees of aggregate product diversi￿cation. In order to test our
hypothesis empirically, we use the following econometric speci￿cation:
yit =  + divit + 
0
Xit + i + t + eit i = 1;:::;n t = 1;:::;T (1)
where yit is a measure of the productivity dispersion in industry i at point in time
t, i is a industry ￿xed e￿ect, t a time ￿xed e￿ect, and "it is the error term. The
aggregate degree of product diversi￿cation of industry i at time t is denoted by
divit. Xit are other exogenous control variables. Using the data from our producer-
product-panel, we compute labor productivity distribution moments for each four-
digit manufacturing industry. Labor productivity at the ￿rm-level is measured as the
logarithm of value added per employee-hour. Value added is calculated as the di￿er-
ence between gross value added and all intermediate inputs. 10 We follow Syverson
(2004b) and employ two di￿erent measures in order to quantify intra-industry pro-
ductivity di￿erences. We measure industry productivity dispersion as the interdecile
productivity range (IDR), which is the distance between the 90 th percentile and the
10th percentile of the within-industry productivity distribution. Alternatively, we use
the interquartile range (IQR) of the productivity distribution to test the robustness
of our results with respect to a modi￿ed productivity dispersion measure. Further,
since aggregate product diversi￿cation might not only a￿ect the lower and the upper
ends of the productivity distribution, we also incorporate a central tendency moment
10 We could not compute total factor productivity (TFP) as an alternative productivity measure
since TFP estimation requires information on investments or a ￿rm’s capital stock. Unfortu-
nately, these data are not available in German Cost Structure Survey of Manufacturing.
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(MP) and regress it on measures of aggregate industry product diversi￿cation.
Aggregate product diversi￿cation, divit, our variable of primary interest, is calculated
as follows. First, we measure the degree of product diversi￿cation for each ￿rm. Then
we derive an aggregate industry diversi￿cation index by taking the average across
all four-digit industry establishments. Product diversi￿cation at the ￿rm-level is
measured in two ways. First, by the primary product specialization index ( PPS),
which is based on the share of sales of the most important product in total sales. 11
The primary product specialization index for ￿rm k is given by
PPSk = 1   smax;k (2)
where smax;k denotes the fraction of sales accounted for by products within the indus-
try’s primary product class (as assigned by the four-digit product-level taxonomy).
By de￿nition, for a single-product ￿rm, the share of sales of the most import product
in total sales is equal to one. Thus, the primary product specialization index is zero
which indicates that a ￿rm is not diversi￿ed at all. Second, we employ a Shannon




skl  ln(1=skl) (3)
where skl indexes the share of product l in total sales of ￿rm k.
We must point out that the productivity distribution of an industry might also be
a￿ected by other in￿uences. These additional factors are summarized in the vector of
control variables Xit. As described, both sunk entry costs and ￿xed operating costs
are likely to impinge on the moments of the distribution. In the empirical analysis,
the average capital intensity (capital intensity) across industry establishments is used
as a proxy for sunk costs of entry. Capital intensity is de￿ned as the user cost
of capital (depreciation plus rents and leases) per employee. Although user cost
of capital will not be a perfect measure of tangible capital requirements to start
production, it is plausible to assume that they are highly correlated with a ￿rm’s
11 For an overview about various diversi￿cation measures, see Gollop and Monahan (1991).
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 028capital stock (H￿lzl, 2003). Hence, our capital intensity measure will adequately
account for mobility barriers negatively in￿uencing entry and exit, and therefore the
moments of the labor productivity distribution. Fixed operating costs ( ￿xed costs)
are obtained by the ratio of labor costs (wages and salaries plus social insurance)
to total costs, averaged across all industry establishments. Because of the prevailing
labor market rigidities in Germany preventing employer from rapidly changing wages,
salaries and the number of employees, the ratio should e￿ectively capture ￿xed costs
of production. In order to control for technology and innovation related factors that
shape the within-industry productivity distribution, we incorporate the average R&D
intensity (R&D intensity ) of a sector in our econometric model. R&D intensity at
the ￿rm-level is de￿ned as the share of R&D workers in the total workforce. Another
possible explanation of persistent productivity dispersion is the openness to trade.
We use the export intensity (export intensity) as a proxy for international trade
exposure. Export intensity is calculated as the share of exports in total industry
output. As a proxy for output market competition and market imperfections, we
introduce a Hirschman-Her￿ndahl index (concentration). The index is measured as
the sum of square of each ￿rm’s sales share in the respective four-digit industry.
Further, we control for market size e￿ects by including total industry sales ( market
size) in the analysis. It was pointed out above that market intervention policies might
also impinge on the moments of the productivity distribution. We try to account
for that by computing an industry’s subsidy intensity ( subsidy intensity ), which is
de￿ned as the amount of total subsidies granted divided by total industry output. A
summary of variable de￿nitions is reported in Table 1.
14
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Name De￿nition
Interdecile Range (IDR)
Distance between the 90
th percentile and the
10
th percentile of the within-industry
productivity distribution.
Interquartile Range (IQR)
Distance between the 75
th percentile and the
25
th percentile of the within-industry
productivity distribution.
Mean Labor Productivity (MP) Mean industry labor productivity level.
PPS
One minus the share of sales accounted for by
the primary product averaged across industry
establishments.
Entropy
Entropy measure of diversi￿cation averaged
across industry establishments.
Capital Intensity
User cost of capital (depreciation plus rents and
leases) per employee averaged across industry
establishments.
Fixed Costs
Ratio of labor costs (wages and salaries plus
social insurance) to total costs averaged across
industry establishments.
Subsidy Intensity
Total amount of granted subsidies divided by
total industry output.
Export Intensity Share of exports in total industry output.
Concentration Hirschman-Her￿ndahl index of concentration.
R&D Intensity
Share of R&D workers in the total workforce
averaged across industry establishments.
Market Size Total industry sales.
4 Empirical Results
Summary statistics are presented in Table 2. As can be seen, the average within-
industry interquartile range of logged labor productivity values is roughly 0.85. This
indicates large intra-industry di￿erences in productivity. Including more of the tails
of the productivity distribution ampli￿es intra-industry heterogeneity. The average
interdecentile productivity range is 1.68. Table 3 displays pairwise correlation co-
e￿cients. In general, the correlations among the independent variables show that
15
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of 0.86 between PPS and entropy reveals that both measures of aggregate product
diversi￿cation are highly correlated.
Table 2: Summary statistics of employed variables
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Interdecentile Range (IDR) 752 1.678 0.458 0.785 4.243
Interquartile Range (IQR) 752 0.854 0.258 0.382 2.951
Mean Productivity (MP) 752 3.224 0.273 2.581 4.796
Diversi￿cation (PPS) 752 0.079 0.042 0 0.268
Diversi￿cation (Entropy) 752 0.311 0.139 0 0.807
Capital Intensity 752 9094 4559 2933 39099
Fixed Costs 752 0.543 0.077 0.235 0.699
Subsidy Intensity 752 0.000 0.002 0 0.034
Export Intensity 752 0.334 0.186 0.002 0.799
Concentration 752 0.106 0.088 0.014 0.562
R&D Intensity 752 0.020 0.023 0 0.114
Market Size 752 5.82E+09 1.50E+10 1.33E+08 1.74E+11
In section 2 of this paper, it is suggested that not all industries in the same man-
ner o￿er the opportunity for ￿rms to diversify. We expect remarkable inter-industry
di￿erences in the pattern of diversi￿cation. In order to illustrate inter-industry dif-
ferences, we plot Kernel density estimates of the aggregate primary product spe-
cialization index (PPS) and of the aggregate entropy index across all 189 four-digit
industries in Figure 1. Indeed, the graphs show that there are signi￿cant di￿erences
across industries with respect to the average degree of diversi￿cation.
16
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In order to estimate the parameter of regression equation (1), we use a ￿xed e￿ects
model. Employing a ￿xed e￿ects model speci￿cation allows us to control for other
unobserved time-invariant in￿uences. We believe this is a notable advantage over
related studies that merely rely on cross-sectional analysis (see Syverson, 2004b;
Balasubramanian and Sivadasan, 2009). The estimation results are summarized in
Table 4.
In Table 4, we show the results of regressing the interdecile productivity range (i.e.,
the distance between the 90 th percentile and the 10th percentile of the within-industry
productivity distribution) on the industry product diversi￿cation measures and the
control variables. In column 1 to column 3, we show the results of using the primary
product specialization index (PPS) to capture the degree of product diversi￿cation of
an industry. The conclusion is that aggregate product diversi￿cation of an industry
is positively and signi￿cantly related to an industry’s labor productivity dispersion.
In column 1, we ￿nd estimates from a benchmark ￿xed e￿ects model with year ￿xed
e￿ects. We see that the inclusion of addition controls (Model 2 and Model 3) does not
a￿ect the basic result. The coe￿cient for product diversi￿cation remains positive and
signi￿cant. Further, we see that the incorporation of additional covariates does not
substantially increase the ￿t of model. The within R-squared increases only slightly
from 0.045 (Model 1) to 0.062 (Model 3). This suggests that aggregate product
18
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Dep. Variable:
IDR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PPS 3.946*** 3.917*** 3.937***
( 1.160) (1.159) (1.118)
Entropy 1.072*** 1.079*** 1.108***
(0.283) (0.276) (0.268)
Capital Intensity 0.000 0.000 7.89e-06 9.66e-06
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed Costs -0.807 -0.085 -1.041 -1.099
(1.430) (1.145) (1.429) (1.446)
Subsidy Intensity 7.565** 7.780**
(3.133) (3.135)




R&D Intensity -1.015 -1.050
(2.863) (2.771)
Market Size 1.66e-12 7.52e-13
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1.382*** 1.7135* 1.744* 1.359*** 1.861** 1.901
(0.092) (0.891) (0.928) (0.090) (0.891) (0.921)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 752 752 752 752 752 752
R2- within 0.045 0.049 0.062 0.049 0.053 0.068
R2- between 0.058 0.181 0.210 0.083 0.250 0.258
R2- overall 0.056 0.166 0.193 0.079 0.228 0.236
Prob > F 0.008 0.026 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The estimation method is ￿xed e￿ects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** 1% level of signi￿cance, ** 5% level of signi￿cance, * 10% level of signi￿cance.
diversi￿cation is one of the crucial factors in explaining productivity heterogeneity. In
columns 4 to 6, we show estimates from the model using the entropy index ( entropy)
of diversi￿cation as a covariate. The coe￿cients of diversi￿cation keep their signs and
signi￿cance. The ￿ndings obtained are in line with our expectation. We argue that a
high degree of aggregate product diversi￿cation indicates that industry ￿rms spread
their business activities across di￿erent markets. This makes ￿rms less vulnerable
to external shocks and competition-driven selection forces, and thus decreases the
likelihood of market exit. We also point out that product diversi￿cation increases the
likelihood of collusive behavior. Less intense competition due to collusive behavior
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increase of productivity disparity. 12
The estimation results of Table 4 reveal that also subsidy intensity in￿uences the
productivity dispersion of industries. A positive and signi￿cant coe￿cient for sub-
sidy intensity (Model 3 and Model 6) could indicate that competition forces are
weaker in sectors where ine￿cient producer receive public funds. As a result, low
performers might be tempted to remain in the market. This shapes the left tail of
the productivity distribution and increases the productivity dispersion. Although
having in principle the expected signs, the estimated coe￿cients for sunk costs ( cap-
ital intensity), ￿xed costs, R&D intensity, market size and market concentration
(concentration) are all insigni￿cant. A possible explanation for the statistical in-
signi￿cance could be the short time span (2003-2006) of our analysis. An assessment
of the respective variables shows that they do not change much over time. The low
within-variation is certainly a driving force behind the observed insigni￿cance. 13 In
future research, it is intended to expand the dataset to longer time periods. This
will de￿nitely help us to explore the impact of these variables on the productivity
dispersion more e￿ectively.
In order to ensure that our previous ￿ndings do not depend on the measurement of
productivity dispersion, Table A.1 in the Appendix reports the estimation results em-
ploying the interquartile range (i.e., the distance between the 75 th percentile and the
25th percentile of the within-industry productivity distribution) of the intra-industry
productivity distribution as the dependent variable. The estimation outcomes show
a strong positive correlation between aggregate product diversi￿cation and produc-
tivity dispersion, irrespective of the measurement of product diversi￿cation. Also the
coe￿cients for subsidy intensity are positive and signi￿cant. Contrary to our previ-
ous results, we obtain positive and signi￿cant estimates for market size. This ￿nding
12 We control for a non-linear relationship between aggregate product diversi￿cation and pro-
ductivity dispersion by including squared terms of the respective measures in the econometric
model. The insigni￿cance of the coe￿cients that we obtain does not suggest the existence of a
non-linear relationship.
13 The ability of controlling for the potentially large number of unmeasured explanatory variables
by estimating a ￿xed-e￿ects model comes at a certain price. The problem of estimating time-
invariant variables in panel data analyses with unit e￿ects has been widely recognized: since the
￿xed-e￿ects model uses only the within-variance for the estimation and disregards the between-
variance, it does not allow the estimation of (almost) time-invariant variables (Wooldridge,
2002). However, since we are solely interested in the coe￿cients of the time-variant variables,
namely our aggregate product diversi￿cation measures PPS and entropy, the application of a
￿xed-e￿ects model speci￿cation is justi￿ed. Note that ￿tting a random-e￿ects model by using
the between regression estimator yield no qualitative changes for the parameter estimates of the
variables of interest.
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productivity dispersion (see Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). A potential explanation
could be that increases in market size may attract potential entrants causing higher
variation of intra-industry productivity.
So far we have focused on the impact of product diversi￿cation on the dispersion
moments of the productivity distribution. In the following, we also want to assess
the in￿uence of aggregate diversi￿cation on another moment of the distribution,
namely the mean industry productivity level ( MP). In order to do so, we regress
the mean industry productivity on aggregate product diversi￿cation. The results are
shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Product diversi￿cation and mean industry productivity
Dep. Variable:
MP
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
PPS -2.253*** -2.204*** -2.183***
(0.419) (0.404) (0.379)
Entropy -0.430*** -0.403*** -0.416***
(0.116) (0.112) (0.096)
Capital Intensity -9.50e-06 -0.000 -8.64e-06 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed Costs -0.908** -0.892** -0.845* -0.824**
(0.432) (0.429) (0.447) (0.441)
Subsidy Intensity -1.294 -1.161
(1.892) (1.710)




R&D Intensity 0.167 0.106
(0.908) ( 0.945)
Market Size 8.14e-12** 8.47e-12**
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 3.353*** 3.934*** 3.953*** 3.301 3.842*** 3.867***
(0.033) (0.281) (0.302) (0.037) (0.290) (0.308)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 752 752 752 752 752 752
R2- within 0.357 0.370 0.399 0.328 0.339 0.371
R2- between 0.066 0.100 0.153 0.049 0.088 0.125
R2- overall 0.084 0.113 0.167 0.067 0.105 0.140
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: The estimation method is ￿xed e￿ects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** 1% level of signi￿cance, ** 5% level of signi￿cance, * 10% level of signi￿cance.
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cation (PPS and entropy). This implies that higher amounts of aggregate product
diversi￿cation tend to lower mean productivity levels. This result is consistent with
￿ndings of related empirical studies (e.g., Syverson, 2004b; Balasubramanian and
Sivadasan, 2009). The estimated coe￿cients for ￿xed costs are negative and signi￿-
cant which is not fully in line with our expectation. According to theory, higher ￿xed
costs should make it more di￿cult for ine￿cient producers to be pro￿table triggering
their market exit. As a result, increases of ￿xed costs are expected to lead to higher
mean productivity levels. For the subsidy intensity, we obtain negative coe￿cients
supporting our conjecture that subsidies predominantly bene￿t producers from the
lower tail of the productivity distribution. However, the estimated coe￿cients are
insigni￿cant. The coe￿cients for market size are positive and signi￿cant. A possible
explanation for a positive impact of market size on mean productivity could be the
existence of economies of scale. In larger industries, it is more likely that compa-
nies achieve e￿ciency gains through economies of scale which results in higher mean
productivity levels. Similar to our previous ￿ndings, the parameter estimates of all
other control variables turn out to be insigni￿cant.
5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to explore a systematic relationship between the degree
of product diversi￿cation and productivity dispersion at an industry-level. Using a
panel dataset for German manufacturing industries over the period 2003-2006, we ￿nd
that the aggregate degree of product diversi￿cation of an industry is positively related
to intra-industry labor productivity disparity. As discussed in the course of this study,
high levels of aggregate product diversi￿cation indicate that industry ￿rms spread
their business activities across di￿erent product markets. This kind of portfolio
strategy makes ￿rms less vulnerable to external shocks and increases the likelihood
of collusive behavior. As a consequence, the competition-driven selection process
within an industry is weakened, causing persistent productivity di￿erentials across
￿rms, even within narrowly de￿ned industries. We attempt to control for a number
of other in￿uences identi￿ed in the theoretical and empirical literature. Although
some of the controls may be imperfect, the robustness of our ￿ndings implies that
they do not severely a￿ect our general result. In this respect, our study makes an
important contribution to the existing literature, since the role played by aggregate
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 028product diversi￿cation in explaining performance heterogeneity has been neglected
by empirical research so far. Finally, though the focus was on the impact of product
diversi￿cation, our empirical analysis has shown further interesting regularities in
the relationship between some of the control variables and the dependent variable.
Especially, the role played by public subsidies de￿nitely deserves more attention in
future research.
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A.1 Product diversi￿cation and interquartile productivity range
Dep. Variable:
IQR (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
PPS 2.180*** 2.160*** 2.142***
(0.628) (0.620) (0.624)
Entropy 0.543*** 0.541*** 0.538***
(0.164) (0.164) (0.168)
Capital Intensity 6.49e-06 4.88e-06 4.17e-06 2.66e-06
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fixed Costs -0.090 0.098 -0.201 -0.211
(0.567) (0.556) (0.578) (0.566)
Subsidy Intensity 4.412** 4.447**
(2.104) (2.060)




R&D Intensity 1.886 1.893
(1.449) (1.538)
Market Size 4.82e-12*** 4.38e-12**
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.686*** 0.680* 0.649 0.689*** 0.763** 0.734*
(0.049) (0.369) (0.372 (0.052) (0.370) (0.372)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 752 752 752 752 752 752
R2- within 0.039 0.040 0.055 0.037 0.038 0.052
R2- between 0.070 0.087 0.122 0.098 0.146 0.163
R2- overall 0.064 0.079 0.111 0.088 0.130 0.148
Prob > F 0.007 0.023 0.008 0.010 0.039 0.008
Notes: The estimation method is ￿xed e￿ects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*** 1% level of signi￿cance, ** 5% level of signi￿cance, * 10% level of signi￿cance.
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